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If existing jurisdictional procedures prove inadequate, Congress
may change the statutes in any of three ways: (1) it could amend
section 1983 to include specifically local governments as "persons";74
(2) it could amend 28 U.S.C. section 1343 to confer original federal
jurisdiction in any claim involving a deprivation of civil rights; and (3)
it could simply add a new statute to allow jurisdiction over local govern-
mental units to redress civil rights. These alternatives seem superior to
the current lower court policy of ignoring the logical Edelman approach.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court on three occasions has unequivocably
declared that Congress did not intend local governmental units to be
subject to liability as "persons" under section 1983. 71 Despite this
mandate, the Fourth Circuit in Burt v. Board of Trustees and Thomas
v. Ward allowed plaintiffs to recover equitable back pay judgments
against defendant school boards simply by naming the members as
nominal defendants. In light of recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments in the analogous state sovereignty context, the reasoning in these
cases seems strained and illogical. The division of authority on the
issue indicates the need for further Supreme Court definition of
"person" in the section 1983 context. The ultimate solution, however,
would be a congressional overhaul of the federal civil rights statutes
to provide an effective method of redressing constitutional wrongs in
a federal forum.
JERRY ALAN REESE
Judicial Discipline-The North Carolina Commission System
"Courts, be they high or low, should and must be like Caesar's
wife, above suspicion. Any other standard is one which undermines the
trust and confidence of the average citizen in his government."' Re-
cently, North Carolina took steps to ensure that its judiciary exhibit this
74. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, A REPORT ON EQUAL
PRO'rECION IN nmE SouTH 179-80 (1965). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RoHs, 1961 REPORT, BK. 5: JUs CE, at 73-75 (1961).
75. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. at 710 n.27.
1. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 698, 304 A.2d 587, 607 (1973).
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high standard of conduct. In addition to the traditional devices of
impeachment' and address,3 North Carolina now has, by virture of a
constitutional amendment4 and enabling legislation,5 a new method of
handling judicial misconduct-the Judicial Standards Commission.6
Traditional methods of handling judicial discipline have proven
generally cumbersome and ineffective.' In recent years many jurisdic-
tions have realized that a better system of judicial discipline is needed,
especially when the judicial misconduct does not clearly warrant remov-
al." In response to this need, new discipline machinery has been
established in a majority of the states over the past three decades.9
California created the first judicial qualifications commission in 1960 by
constitutional amendment. 10 The California model, in whole or in part,
has been copied in many jurisdictions," including North Carolina.
-Upon recommendation of the Courts Commission"z in 1971 a con-
2. Impeachment is a procedure in which the House of Representatives brings
charges and the Senate sits as the court. Two-thirds of the senators present can convict.
Judgment cannot extend beyond removal from and disqualification to hold office. N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 4.
3. Address is a procedure whereby a judge may be removed for mental or physical
incapacity by a joint resolution of two-thirds of the General Assembly. N.C. CONST.
art. IV, § 17(1).
4. The amendment changed art. IV, § 17(1), and added art. IV, 9 17(2).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. H 7A-375 to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6. Hereinafter referred to as Commission.
7. W. BRArrHwArrE, WHO JUiES TmE JuDGEs? 12-13 (1971); Frankel, The Case
for Judicial Disciplinary Measures, 49 AM. Jun. Soc'Y J. 018, 218-20 (1966). Address
has apparently never been used in North Carolina. Since 1868, only two North
Carolina judges have been impeached. Neither was convicted. A third judge had
impeachment articles preferred, but they were withdrawn. Prior to 1868, judges were
selected by General Assembly vote so it is unlikely that any were impeached. NORTH
CAROLINA COURTS COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COURTS REPor]. There are no digested cases of the
North Carolina Supreme Court removing judges based on its supervisor power.
8. AMERcAN JuDicATURB SociETY, JUDICIAL DISABILITY AND REMOVAL Com-
MISSIONS, COURTS AND PROCEDURES i (1972) [hereinafter cited as AJS]; COURTS REPORT
at 19-22.
9. AJS at i; COURTS REPORT at 22. New York became the first state to
establish a modem disciplinary system when, in 1947, it created a court on the
judiciary. The court is convened when a complaint is filed by officials specifi-
cally authorized by law to do so. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, § 22. Delaware and Okla-
homa have similar courts on the judiciary. Compared to a commission system, the
judiciary court system is more formal and cumbersome and, therefore, less desirable. It
works on an ad hoc basis and handles only the most serious matters. COURTS REPORT
at 25.
10. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 18.
11. Jurisdictions adopting a commission plan include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia. AMS, supra note 8, at i.
12. The Courts Commission was originally established as a temporary commission
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stitutional amendment was proposed and adopted, adding the following
language to the North Carolina Constitution:
(2) Additional method of removal of Judges. The General
Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in addition to impeachment
and address set forth in -this section, for the removal of a Justice or
Judge of the General Court of Justice for mental or physical in-
capacity interfering with the performance of his duties which is,
or is likely to become, permanent, and for the censure and removal
of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for wilful
misconduct in office, wilful and pergistent failure to perform his
duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.13
The General Assembly, acting on constitutional mandate, created the
North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission effective January 1,
1973.14
The Commission has power to recommend to the supreme court
the censure or removal of any judge or justice for the reasons given in
the constitution.1 5 The Commission may institute a preliminary investi-
gation either upon citizen complaint or upon its own motion.10 If
further proceedings are warranted, a formal due process hearing is held
on the exclusive basis of which the Commission may recommend disci-
pline to the supreme court.1 7 The entire process is confidential except
for the recommendation and supporting record sent to the court and the
courts subsequent proceedings.1 8  Only the supreme court has the
actual power of censure or removal. 9 The court, in its descretion, may
dismiss the case, follow the Commission's recommendation, or remand
for further proceedings.2"
The commission system offers an excellent means of dealing with
judicial impropriety. It is inexpensive, fair, and flexible. Easy access
allows members of the public to raise their greviances, while confiden-
in 1963 to design a modern, efficient court system for North Carolina. Res. of June 11,
1963, No. 73, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1815. The Courts Commission was made
permanent in 1969, Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 910, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. Laws 1046,
but in 1975 was disestablished. Law of June 26, 1975, ch. 956, § 18, 11975] N.C. Sess.
Laws 1405.
13. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2).
14. N.C. GEN. STA'r. §§ 7A-375 to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
15. Id. § 7A-376.
16. Id. § 7A-377(a).
17. Id.
18. The accused has a right to have the proceedings open to the public. Id.
19. Id. § 7A-376.
20. Id. § 7A-377(a).
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tiality protects judges from unjustified harrassment. Most importantly,
the Commission acts as a strong deterrent to the kinds of offenses that
are unlikely to result in impeachment but that, nevertheless, lower the
public's respect for the justice system.2  A recent case, In re Crutch-
field,2 2 is a good example of such misconduct.
Crutchfield provided the supreme court with its first recommenda-
tion from the Commission. The court, following the Commission's
recommendation, censured Judge Crutchfield for "conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute" 2 when he signed orders allowing limited driving privileges to
defendants who were not entitled to such privileges. 24  The orders were
signed upon mere ex parte applications of the defendants' attorneys,
violating the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.25  More serious,
however, was the judge's total failure to determine the facts or control-
ling law.2 6  The court found the judge's good faith defenses unavail-
ing.
27
Curiously, the defendant, Judge Crutchfield, never questioned
the constitutionality of the untried Commission process in his brief.
However, in a vigorous dissent, Justice Lake raised due process and
equal protection issues on his own motionl and found that Commission
procedure violative of both the United States and North Carolina Con-
21. CounTs REPORT, supra note 7, at 25-26.
22. No. 97 (N.C. Sup. Ct., Dec. 17, 1975) (unreported).
23. Majority Opinion at 7, quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2).
24. Persons arrested for driving under the influence are disallowed limited driving
privileges by statute if they refuse to take a breathalyzer test. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-
16.2, -179 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
25. "A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceed-
ing, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by
law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending
or impending proceeding." N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CowDUCr Canon 3(A) (4). Two
Florida supreme court judges were similarly reprimanded for their mishandling or misuse
of an ex parte memorandum. In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Dekle, 308
So.2d 5 (Fla. 1975).
26. Majority Opinion at 6.
27. Id. at 5-6. Crutchfield raised three basic defenses: (1) justifiable reliance on
an attorney to draw a proper order, (2) no bad faith, and (3) no financial gain. Brief
for Petitioner at 1.
Two Maryland judges were removed for "conduct prejudicial," due to irregularitiet
in disposing of traffic cases, although they received no financial benefit, and followed
practices of predecessor courts. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
28. The dissent raises the constitutional issues on its own motion under the
principle that jurisdiction is always a proper inquiry. The statute contains jurisdictional,
procedural, and substantive provisions. The dissent reasons that because the substantive
and procedural provisions violate the constitution, the statute is void, and the court lacks
jurisdiction. Dissenting Opinion at 1-2.
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stitutions.29 Because the supreme court may act "only upon the recom-
mendation of the Commission,""° and because the Commission has
broad discretion in determining the sanction it will recommend, Justice
Lake argued that there is an "invitation to gross favoritism" that violates
equal protection.31 The dissent also found due process violations in the
procedural aspects of the Commission proceeding. The fact that the
hearing is closed,32 that the Commission is judge, jury, and prosecutor, 3
and that the Commission can write its own rules"s all bear on Justice
Lake's conclusion. Justice Lake would also hold void for vagueness the
disciplinary ground of "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice."3 5
The majority opinion is noticeably unresponsive to the dissent's
concerns. Whether the majority felt that the issues were improperly
raised or well settled is unclear; however, the latter is a sound conclusion
based upon an examination of other cases.36 This note will identify the
responses of other courts to Justice Lake's arguments, and then examine
some North Carolina constitutional issues not raised in Crutchfield.
The weight of authority at the federal level holds that wide discre-
tion vested in an administrative body, in and of itself, does not vio-
late the Constitution. 7  Stricter doctrines of non-delegation are justi-
fiably found at the state level since "state legislatures much more than
Congress tend to delegate [responsibility] to petty officials who are
authorized to act without adequate safeguards." s38 Such concerns are
inappropriate in the Commission setting where, not only is the Commis-
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 4. The word "only" is inserted by the dissent. The statute reads:
"[u]pon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may... ." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Thus, the court retains whatever authority it pre-
viously had, unless the court itself reads a negative implication into the statute.
31. Dissenting Opinion at 5.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
36. See, e.g., Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re Hanson, 532
P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975); In re Kelley, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1971); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Diener, 268 Md.
659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
37. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINim-&ATrvB LAW TEATISB § 2.01 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvIs]. Equal protection does not assure uniformity of decisions, only freedom
from intentional and purposeful discrimination. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8
(1944). It is significant that there were no allegations in Crutchfield that intentional or
purposeful discrimination had actually occurred. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608,
615-16 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
38. 1 DAvis § 2.07, at 101.
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sion a distinguished body of officials, 9 but the Commission's power is
limited to recommending, and court review of Commission recommen-
dations is mandatory.40
In those cases that have found an unconstitutional delegation of
authority to an administrative body, the opportunity for arbitrary exer-
cise of power went well beyond what was reasonably necessary for
proper administration of the program involved.41 The discretion grant-
ed thd North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission is an integral and
necessary part of the program. 42 The wide range of possible charges,
fact situations, and substantiation, requires that the Commission have
flexibility to respond to both major and minor cases.43 Not suprisingly,
it was the rigidity of the traditional methods of policing the judiciary
that made them ineffective deterrents.44
Due process does not preclude delegation of decisions involving
penalties to administrative agencies, so long as those penalties are not
criminal. 45 The line between civil and criminal penalties is difficult to
draw, but monetary penalties can clearly be civil.46  Nor is there a
distinction based on the severity of the penalty. Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) orders depriving persons of their professions as
brokers have been upheld, even when the SEC determined not only that
a penalty should be imposed, but also its extent.47
Commission systems in other jurisdictions have been upheld
against many of the same due process attacks leveled in Crutchfield.4"
Unless some distinguishing feature of the North Carolina system is fatal,
it too should pass constitutional muster. It is well settled law that an
administrative body can be judge, jury, and prosecutor.4 9 The full
39. The Commission consists of one court of appeals judge, one superior court
judge, one district court judge, two senior members of the state bar, and two lay citizens.
The judges are appointed by the Chief Justice, the citizens by the Governor, and the
attorneys are elected by the State Bar Council. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 7A-375(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
40. See N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 7A-376, 7A-377(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). It is not
clear precisely what standard of review the court is using, but other jurisdictions have
adopted one in which the court reviews the transcript and makes its own independent
findings of fact and law. In re Hanson, 352 P.2d 303, 308-09 (Alaska 1975).
41. 1 DAVIS § 2.10, at 114.
42. CourS REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 19-20.
45. See 1 DAvis § 2.13, at 133-34.
46. Id. at 135.
47. Id. at 134.
48. See, e.g., Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
49. 2 DAvis § 13.02, at 181. The judge-jury-prosecutor due process objection has
1976] 1079
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extent of due process is not required in a disciplinary proceeding
because it is not criminal in nature."0 The standard normally applied in
this situation is "minimum due process" with the emphasis on notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 1 Minimal due process protection is
provided by the Judicial Standards Commission Rules. 52 Furthermore,
the independent court review of facts and law upon any recommenda-
tion would seem adequate to insure that the system is not abused.58
Statutes are generally said to enjoy a presumption of constitutional-
ity. Consequently, if a statute can be exercised in a constitutional
manner it should be given that chance and not struck down on its face."4
Thus, the fact that the statute does not outline specific due process
safeguards to be followed, but instead instructs the Commission to devel-
op procedures "affording due process of law,"55 should not be fatal.
The Crutchfield dissent also charged that the confidentiality of the
commission process up to the supreme court level is inconsistent with
due process. 58 By contrast, the advocates of the system herald the
confidentiality of the system as one of its greatest assets, and consider it
vital. 57  Allegations of misconduct may be groundless and thus the
faultless judge is protected from the publicity of an unsupported charge.
Public confidence in the integrity of the court system is likewise protect-
ed from diminution by unfounded allegations. In addition, complain-
ants and witnesses need not be reluctant to complain or testify for fear of
publicity or reprisal. 58 Once the Commission recommends discipline,
been rejected in every jurisdiction in which the issue was raised in a judicial commission
context. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975).
50. Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In the judicial discipline
context, all jurisdictions which have considered the question have rejected the criminal
standard of proof. Most have also rejected a preponderance standard in favor of a clear
and convincing test. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 307-08 (Alaska 1975). In Crutch-
field, both majority and dissent agree the proceeding is not criminal. Majority Opinion
at 5. Dissenting Opinion at 3.
51. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1971).
52. JurucrA.L STANDARDS COMM'N R. 8 provides for notice. R. 13 provides for
opportunity to be heard.
53. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 307 (Alaska 1975).
54. Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S.
1043 (1974). In Smith the court upheld a regulatory ordinance by inferring a hearing
would be held and that decisions would be made on reasonable grounds. Id. at 537, 206
S.E.2d at 207.
55. The Commission is authorized to write its own rules, but must do so within an
express due process limitation. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 7A-377(a) (Cur. Supp. 1975).
56. Dissenting Opinion at 6.
57. Confidentiality provisions are found in nearly all the commission systems of
other jurisdictions. Coutxs REPORT, supra note 7, at 25.
58. Id. at 24-25.
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the purpose of confidentiality disappears and subsequent proceedings
are, by law, public. 9 In sum, there seems to be a valid exercise of
legitimate state interests, interests closely related to those served by the
use of a grand jury in criminal proceedings. Again there is an ultimate
check on abuse-the right of the accused to request public proceedings
at any time.60
The void for vagueness attack on the power to discipline for "con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of Justice" has been rejected else-
where."1 The North Carolina General Assembly intended the Code of
Judicial Conduct to be read into the phrase to give it meaning.62 Indeed,
if the Code is to have any real meaning such a provision is essential."3
"Conduct prejudicial" is no more vague than many other valid con-
cepts of law.64 It should be noted that, not merely would the statute be
void if this attack were sustained, but the constitutional amendment as
well, since the grounds for discipline are enumerated therein.
One problem, not raised in Crutchfield and peculiar to North
Carolina, poses a serious question of the constitutionality of the commis-
sion system as it is presently structured. The words of the commission
statute, "[u]pon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme
Court may censure or remove,"'65 clearly either assume, or attempt to
grant, supreme court jurisdiction. In North Carolina, supreme court
jurisdiction is conferred by the state constitution and not by the General
Assembly.6 6 Supreme court jurisdiction to remove judges. is not appar-
59. See N.C. Gm. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
60. See id.; JuDicAL STANDIARDS COMM'N R. 4.
61. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 614-15 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also In re
Diener, 268 Md. 659, 671, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (1973), where the court says that "conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" is incapable of precise definition "but
it is unlikely we shall ever have much trouble recognizing and identifying such conduct."
62. COuRTS REPORT, supra note 7, at 28. The majority approves of such a use of
the Code. Majority Opinion at 7, citing with approval Spruance v. Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 796, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841,
853 (1975).
63. The Code of Judicial Conduct, unlike the Code of Professional Responsibility,
does not have mandatory disciplinary rules. The Judicial Code is phrased in terms of
"should" like the ethical considerations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While
the Code may be used to give meaning to the constitutional provision, discipline may be
based only on a violation that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. In re
Haggerty, 257 La. 2, 17, 241 So. 2d 469, 474 (1970).
64. See generally In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 476-77, 318 A.2d 523, 537-38 (1974).
See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding discipline of a military officer
for conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" against a vagueness attack); Allen
v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971) (policeman).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cor. Supp. 1975).
66. State ex rel. N.C. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 422,
142 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1965).
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ent on the face of the constitution. In fact, supreme court jurisdiction
seems limited solely to appeals from "the courts below."67
Thr new discipline section in the North Carolina Constitution
provides that "[tihe General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in
addition to impeachment and address . . . for the removal of [judges]
... 1)68 The import of that language would seem to be that the
Assembly can exercise its removal power through a procedure other
than impeachment or address. However, the same constitutional
amendment altered another section to read: "[riemoval from office by
the General Assembly for any other cause [other than address] shall be
by impeachment." 69 The two sections read together mandate that the
Assembly prescribe a procedure for the removal of judges by a body
other than the General Assembly.
The issue then becomes whether the Assembly can grant the power
of removal to another body, or whether it is limited to merely prescrib-
ing a procedure for a body that already possesses the removal power. If
the Assembly can vest the power of removal in another body, it may be
restricted in the body it can choose. If the power of removal is
characterized as a "judicial power," then the Assembly would seem
limited by article IV, § 1 of the constitution to vesting the power of
removal in the judiciary.70 If the power of removal is non-judicial, or if
the new discipline section71 overrides the judicial power section 2 of the
constitution, the Assembly may be able to give the power of removal to
any body--executive, judicial, legislative (except itself).73 There are of
course many policy reasons why the Assembly might not want to vest
the power in anyone other than the judiciary, 74 but that result is not
necessarily mandated by the constitution. If the power were given to a
non-judicial body, the scope of judicial review, if any, would be an
unavoidable issue.
67. N.C. CONST. art. [V, § 12(1); State ex rel. N.C. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort
Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 422, 142 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (1965).
68. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 17(2).
69. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(1) (emphasis added to words affixed by amend-
ment).
70. Art. I.r, § 1 requires that the "judicial power of the State" be vested in a court.
Some judicial powers can be given to administrative agencies, but ultimate power
remains in the courts via appeal. Id. § 3.
71. Id. § 17(2).
72. Id. § 1.
73. Id. § 17(1).
74. A primary reason for giving the discipline power only to the judiciary is to
retain a measure of judicial independence, an idea basic to our system of justice. See
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 136-
37 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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If the General Assembly cannot vest the power of removal in
another body but may merely prescribe a procedure for a body that
already has the power, it apparently must rely on the supreme court's
supervisory power over the other courts, found in article 1, § 12(1) of
the constitution or at common law.75 If the scope of the court's
supervisory power under either theory extends to removal, the Assembly
can comply with its constitutional mandate to "prescribe a procedure." 76
There are no disciplinary decisions as such in North Carolina, so the
possibility that the supervisory power includes removal is at least not
foreclosed.
In England the supervisory power of the common-law courts clear-
ly extended to removal.17 The writs used were scire facias and quo
warranto.7 The scire facias writ is especially analogous to removal
under article IV, § 17 (2). Scire facias was applied against judges who
held office "during good behavior." The causes for which a writ would
issue were similar to those listed in the constitutional provisions of
article IV, § 17(2)." 9 Some authorities argue that the judicial pow-
er of forfeiture in England was abolished by statute as early as 1700.
Others consider removal by scire facias still available."0 There appear
to be no modem cases which rely on these early writs.8 '
Whether the common-law removal doctrines are good law in the
United States is open to some question. The author can find no cases in
which a court has directly removed a judge from office based on either
its inherent common-law or constitutional supervisory powers.8 2 Some
courts have relied on their supervisory power to discipline members of
the bar in an indirect attempt to deter judicial midconduct. 3 Some
75. It is difficult to say how the constitutional supervisory power relates to the
common law power, but it would seem safe to assume the common law power is still
viable either as an independent power or as a way to interpret the constitution.
76. If the legality of the Commission is based on this theory, one wonders why a
constitutional amendment was necessary.
77. Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J.
1475, 1479-82 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; Shartel, Federal Fudges-Appoint-
ment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MicH.
L. Rnv. 870, 882-83 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Shartel]; Annot. 53 A.L.R.3d 882, § 3
(1973).
78. Shartel, supra note 77, at 882-83.
79. Id. at 883.
80. Berger, supra note 77, at 1482, 1500.
81. Id at 1482 n.38.
82. For a good review of the cases on supervisory power and discipline see In re
Diener, 268 Md. 659, 699-715, 304 A.2d 587, 608-16 (1973) (Smith, J., dissenting).
83. In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973) and In re DeSaulpier, 360 Mass.
787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972) appear to be such cases. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 688,
304 A.2d 587, 602 (1973).
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courts find a direct power to suspend a judge in their supervisory
jurisdiction, but exclude more severe penalties.84 Others go no further
than censure.85  There are no North Carolina decisions on point. It
may be said that courts are uniformly reticent about using their supervi-
sory power for direct removal.
8 6
Even if the supreme court is constitutionally authorized to remove
judges, procedural problems remain. If the power is based on the
court's supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts, it may be inapplicable
to supreme court justices.8 7 Regardless of the source of the authority,
its exercise would seem governed by article IV, § 12(1) of the constitu-
tion which provides that the supreme court is strictly an appellate court
with jurisdiction to hear cases solely from "the courts below."88 This
jurisdiction does not include direct appeals from agencies even though
they may be quasi-judicial.89 In spite of article IV, § 12(1), the direct
commission to supreme court route might be justified. Under the
statutory grant of power theory, the authorizing section of the constitu-
tion (article IV, § 17(2)) might be found to override article IV, § 12
(1). Under a supervisory power theory it might be held that the
supervisory jurisdiction is separate and independant from other jurisdic-
tion, and therefore, the "appellate only" limitation does not apply. 0
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission is a signifi-
cant improvement over traditional methods of judicial discipline. The
Commission offers great promise in deterring activities such as those for
which Judge Crutchfield was censured, activities which previously were
virtually immune from control, but which jeopardize the citizen's confi-
84. See Ransford v. Graham, 374 Mich. 104, 131 N.W.2d 201 (1964); In re
Graham, 366 Mich. 268, 114 N.W.2d 333 (1962).
85. In re Municipal Court, 188 N.W.2d 354 (Iowa 1971).
86. See In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 699-715, 304 A.2d 587, 608-16 (1973) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
87. But cf. McDonald v. Morrow, 119 N.C. 666, 672, 26 S.E. 132, 134 (1896),
where the supreme court held individual justices could be treated as lower courts by the
General Assembly in at least some contexts.
88. The Commission could arguably be considered a court, but this is an unlikely
result since it would raise other problems. The constitution defines the court system in
detail and does not provide for a court like the Commission. N.C. CoNsr. art. IV, §§ 2-
10. Neither would the constitution allow delegation of rule making power to the
Commission if classified as a court. N.C. CONsr. art. IV, § 13(2).
89. See State ex reL N.C. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416,
420, 422, 142 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1965).
90. See In re Huff, 352 Mich. 402, 418, 91 N.W.2d 613, 620 (1958).
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dence in his judicial system. The Commission system also adds some
needed bite to the Code of Judicial Conduct. In light of the judicial
commission cases from other jurisdictions, the North Carolina system
seems unlikely to run afoul of the due process and equal protection
challenges raised by the Crutchfield dissent. There are, nevertheless,
some jurisdictional problems posed by the judicial article of the North
Carolina Constitution. Hopefully, the General Assembly will remedy
these problems, or the court will find a way to reconcile them, so that
the Commission can fulfill its promise in North Carolina.
EDWIN WAPREN SMALL
Property Law-The Beneficiary's Rights to the Proceeds of an
Insurance Policy When He Takes the Life of the Insured
Enacted in 1961, Chapter 31A of the North Carolina General
Statutes precludes one who is convicted of a wilful and unlawful homi-
cide from acquiring a proprietary benefit because of the death of his
victim.' In Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
life insurance provisions of this chapter.' Faced with the issue whether
1. Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. REv. 175, 193 (1962).
2. 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
3. For the purposes of this note the relevant sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A
(1966) are:
§ 31A-3. Definitions.-As used in this article, unless the context other-
wise requires, the term-
(3) "Slayer" means
a. Any person who by a court of competent jurisdiction shall have
been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact of the
wilful and unlawful killing of another person; ....
§ 31A-11. Insurance benefits.-(a) Insurance and annuity proceeds pay-
able to the slayer:
(1) As the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insur-
ance on the life of the decedent, or
(2) In any other manner payable to the slayer by virtue of his surviving
the decedent, shall be paid to the person or persons who would
have been entitled thereto as if the slayer had predeceased the
decedent.
31A-13.-Record determining slayer admissible in evidence.-The rec-
ord of the judicial proceeding in which the slayer was determined to be such,
pursuant to § 3 1A-3 of this chapter, shall be admissible in evidence for or
against a claimant of property in any civil action arising under this chapter.
